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Abstract
We contribute to the literature on optimal growth in two-sector models by solving a Ram-
sey problem with a concave utility function. The unique possible steady-state is independent
of initial conditions and of the instantaneous utility function, but not of the discount rate, and
is characterized by a wage-rental ratio depending solely on the technology of the capital sector.
For an initially low-capital economy, we show that the wage-rental ratio increasingly converges
to its balanced value during transition. If the consumption sector is relatively capital-intensive,
the relative price of capital increases during transition. If the investment sector is relatively
more capital-intensive, it decreases. We also prove that a negative shock on the subjective
rate of impatience, that makes the social planner more patient, leads to an immediate positive
jump in asset prices.
Keywords: Capital accumulation, optimal growth, golden rule, two-sector models.
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1
Introduction
Two-sector growth models that explicitly distinguish between the sector producing consumption
goods and the one producing investment goods, each being endowed with a specific production
function, were pretty in fashion in the 1960’s, but sound quite old-world today. Their dismiss from
the standard tool-box of growth theorists is first of all a consequence of the revolution in growth
theory starting with the Solow-Swan model. The property that the saving rate cannot affect the
long-run growth rate but only steady-state consumption level led to a gradual but massive loss
of interest in the role of capital in the process of growth. But another cause of this retirement
of the two-sector framework has been one unpleasant property of early models: in Meade (1961),
Uzawa (1961, 1963) and Kurz (1963), the system is unstable when the investment sector is more
capital-intensive than the consumption sector. This conclusion consistently casted doubt on the
legitimacy of the overall approach. As pointed out by Solow’s (1961), it is indeed very hard to
accept a model that depends on such a strong and arbitrary assumption1.
However, this complication arose solely as a consequence of the not-less arbitrary hypotheses –
in the form of defined saving rates out of labor and capital income – taken in the early literature.
In the subsequent literature on optimal growth in two-sector models, such a pathology does not
appear: in both cases, the optimal path follows a saddle-path, however of different form depending
on which sector is relatively capital-intensive2.
Two-sector models are useful because they add a ‘capital’ degree of freedom to the baseline
neoclassical growth framework, and allows to analyze the pattern of the price of capital during
the process of accumulation of capital, as well as to gain some deeper insight about consumption
and investment in the economy. Furthermore, the one-sector problem can be seen as a reduced
two-sector model where the two sectors share the same capital-intensity3, which makes the latter
models natural extensions of the formers.
Capital was important in the early ages of growth, but it would also be erroneous to think that
it has no special place in today’s seemingly-capitalized economies. As figure 1 shows, the deflator
of private investment4 has decreased relatively to the deflator of GDP and to the CPI in the USA
between 1982 and 2010, meaning that investment goods have seen their price fall relatively to that
of consumption goods. This fact, not to mention the recurrence of bubbles or the coincidence of
real and financial cycles, suggests that the past thirty years have seen the emergence of a new
structural model of growth where capital, in the broadest sense, has a new role. Indeed, the data
seem to militate unequivocally for the thesis of structural change in 1980-82 and, before that, at
the end of the Bretton Woods era5.
This paper contributes to the literature on capital and growth by solving, for the first time,
the Ramsey problem with a concave utility function in a two-sector environment with no technical
progress. Previous articles on the same subject6 implicitly suppose that the utility function is
linear in consumption so that, to our knowledge, no solution of the model presented below exists.
1Solow (1961) also gives a plain analysis of this instability property.
2Uzawa (1965), Shell (1967). Srinivasan (1964) takes the problem from the point of view of the optimal saving
rate, but only considers the case where the consumption sector is relatively capital-intensive. See also the “Sceptical
notes on Uzawa...” by Haque (1970).
3This is also true of models that suppose that there is only one final good, which is readily transformable in A
units of the capital good after each period.
4I.e., the ratio of nominal to real investment. All figures are relegated to last section.
5See Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000) and Gal´ı and Gambetti (2009) on the former, and Greenwood and Yorukoglu
(1997) on the latter.
6Srinivasan (1964), Uzawa (1965) and Shell (1967).
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We will successively describe the steady-state and the pattern of optimal transition, to finally in-
vestigate into the effect of shocks on the rate of preference for present on the dynamics of the system.
The main results are the following. There is a unique steady-state corresponding to a ‘quasi-
golden rule’ similar to the one-sector version of Cass (1965). The steady-state balanced wage-rental
ratio is determined solely by the technology of the investment sector, a property for which we give
an interpretation. We then take the case of an economy that is initially undercapitalized and show
that, then, the wage-rental ratio increases during transition. The relative price of capital in terms
of the consumption good increases (resp. decreases) along the optimal path if the consumption
sector is relatively more (resp. less) capital-intensive than the investment sector. An unexpected
shock that brings the rate of impatience down leads to an immediate positive jump of the relative
price of capital in terms of consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model and introduces
necessary notations, as well as the capital-intensity assumption. Section 2 describes the unique
steady-state and the golden rules. Section 3 sets up the dynamic system. Section 4 analyzes the
pattern of transition of an economy that has initially less capital than is desired in the long-term,
in the case the consumption sector is always relatively capital-intensive. Section 5 makes the same
for the case it is the investment sector that is always relatively capital-intensive. Section 6 analyzes
the dynamical effects of shocks on the subjective discount rate. Section 7 concludes.
1 An exact two-sector Ramsey model
1.1 Presentation of the problem
Time evolves discretely. There are two homogenous goods and two sectors: the consumption
sector produces the consumption good (C) and the investment sector produces the investment
good (I). Both sectors hire capital and labor, which are perfectly mobile across industries, and
produce output according to constant returns to scale production functions, respectively F and G
for consumption and investment:
∀t, Ct = F (K
C
t , L
C
t )
It = G(K
I
t , L
I
t )
(1)
We suppose that F and G are twice continuously differentiable, display diminishing marginal
returns to inputs and satisfy the standard Inada conditions.
Workforce is constant at L and capital stock evolves according to the equation:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It, (2)
where δ is the constant depreciation rate. Initial capital endowment is exogenously given at K0.
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Population is made of a unique infinitely-lived representative agent7 with a twice continuously
differentiable instantaneous utility function v(Ct) = Lu
(
Ct
L
)
, (so that for all C, v′(C) = u′(C/L) =
u′(c)) and discounting future utility by a constant factor β. We suppose that v – and, thus, u –
satisfy traditional Inada conditions8. The social planner solves the following problem:
max
∑∞
t=0 β
tv (Ct)
Ct ≤ F
(
KCt , L
C
t
)
It ≤ G
(
KIt , L
I
t
)
KCt +K
I
t ≤ Kt
LCt + L
I
t ≤ L
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
(3)
Let the vector of Lagrangian multipliers associated with the five constraints be (pC , pI , r, w, q)t.
The Lagrangian is:
L = ∑∞t=0 βt [v (Ct)− pCt (Ct − F (KCt , LCt ))− pIt (It −G (KIt , LIt ))
+wt
(
Lt − LCt − LIt
)
+ rt
(
Kt −KCt −KIt
)
−qt (Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt − It)]
(4)
As v satisfies the Inada condition when C → 0, the social planner will never choose a zero level
of consumption. Therefore, for all t ≥ 0, Ct 6= 0, and first order conditions are:
v′ (Ct) = pCt (5)
{
qt ≤ pIt
qt = p
I
t if and only if It > 0
(6)
pCt
∂F
∂LCt
= wt (7)
7We would of course obtain the same results in the corresponding perfect competitive framework – i.e. with fair
rental price for labor and capital, fair price for both types of output and eventually a perfect credit market – with
infinitely-lived agents.
8As said before, to our knowledge, all existing two-sector optimal growth models assume linear utility. This has
the consequence of setting the implicit value of the consumption good at constant level, and is sometimes legitimized
by taking the consumption good as the ‘nume´raire’. For instance, we reach conclusions that are somewhat different
than those of Shell (1967), which performs a similar analysis. In Shell (1967), specialization in the production
of investment goods can occur for the initially very capital-poor economies because the intertemporal benefits of
producing capital increase when the level of capital become low. Here, because of the Inada conditions imposed on
the utility function, consumption never falls to zero. Our results are smoother, but not qualitatively different.
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{
pIt
∂G
∂LIt
≤ wt
pIt
∂G
∂LIt
= wt if and only if L
I
t > 0
(8)
pCt
∂F
∂KCt
= rt (9)
{
pIt
∂G
∂KIt
≤ rt
pIt
∂G
∂KIt
= rt if and only if K
I
t > 0
(10)
qt = β(rt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1) (11)
(5) states that the price of the consumption good is equal to marginal utility of consumption.
Thus pC is expressed in terms of utility per unit of consumption. (6) states that the supply price of
capital pI must be equal to the demand price q, except at the corner solution where production of
investment good is zero, in which case the shadow supply price exceeds demand price. Equations
from (7) to (10) reflect equalization of marginal productivity of labor and capital to their rental
prices in both sectors9, except in the case of corner solutions where I = 0. Remark that (8) and (10)
prove that pI is expressed in terms of utility per unit of investment good. r and w are respectively
in terms of utility per unit of capital and per unit of labor.
Finally, (11) reflects the fairness of the intertemporal pricing of capital. The first-best subjec-
tive value of one unit of capital at t is equal to the discounted value of the reward it will bring
tomorrow, including capital gains (1− δ)qt+1.
It is more convenient to work with per-capita variables. Let k be the macroeconomic capital-
labor ratio, kC and kI be the sectoral capital-labor ratios and lC and lI be the share of labor
employed in each sector:
kt =
Kt
L
, kCt =
KCt
LCt
, kIt =
KIt
LIt
(12)
lCt =
LCt
L
, lIt =
LIt
L
(13)
We apply the usual transformation to the production functions:
f(kC) = F (kC , 1), g(kI) = G(kI , 1) (14)
9I.e. respectively to the wage rate w and to the capital rent r.
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If both goods are produced, and dropping the time argument, first-order conditions from (7)
to (10) can be reduced to:
pC
(
f(kC)− kCf ′(kC)) = pI (g(kI)− kIg′(kI)) = w (15)
pCf ′(kC) = pIg′(kI) = r (16)
Notice that whenever labor and capital are at full employment, which is here clear at any date,
we have:
{
lCkC + lIkI = k
lC + lI = 1
(17)
So that whenever kC 6= kI :
lC =
k − kI
kC − kI , l
I =
kC − k
kC − kI (18)
1.2 Preliminary notations
Let ω = w/r be the wage-rental ratio. When both goods are produced, (15) and (16) imply that,
independently of the relative price of investment and consumption goods, technological marginal
rates of substitution are equalized across sectors at optimum:
∀t, f(k
C)
f ′(kC)
− kC = g(k
I)
g′(kI)
− kI = ω, (19)
For all ω ≥ 0, there exists unique values of kC and kI satisfying (19). Differentiating (19), we
obtain that:
∂kC
∂ω
(
−ff
′′
f ′2
)(
kC(ω)
)
=
∂kI
∂ω
(
−gg
′′
g′2
)(
kI(ω)
)
= 1, (20)
so that the functions kC(ω) and kI(ω) are increasing in the wage-rental ratio. We also have
that kC(ω)→0 0 and kI(ω)→0 0.
6
We can now introduce the formal relative capital intensity assumptions10:
Definition 1.1. (Capital intensity assumption)
1. The consumption industry is more capital-intensive than the investment industry if, for all
ω > 0,
kC(ω) > kI(ω);
2. The investment industry is more capital-intensive than the consumption industry if, for all
ω > 0,
kC(ω) < kI(ω).
Relative prices of inputs and of goods
Let pt be the relative price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods at t :
pt =
pIt
pCt
(21)
From the demand side, according to (5) and (6), when both goods are produced, we have that:
pt =
qt
u′(ct)
, (22)
where ct = Ct/L.
In optimal one-sector models, the shadow value of consumption and the shadow value of capi-
tal are necessarily equal: when there is only one good, at optimum its marginal value for one use
(consumption) equals its marginal value for the other use (investment)11.
When both goods are produced, in virtue of (16), it holds that:
p(ω) =
f ′(kC(ω))
g′(kI(ω))
(23)
10We do not attempt to solve the problem in presence of capital-intensity reversals for some wage-rental ratios.
11The theoretical structure of two-good models fundamentally differ from that of one-good models. In the latter
class of models, the act of saving is technically the same as the act of investment: what is produced but not
consumed is saved and increases the capital stock, which can itself be consumed as well. In models of the former
type, equilibrium on the market for consumption goods does not mechanically lead to equilibrium on the market
for investment goods. The deeper difference of the two approaches has to do with the interpretation of the S = I
equation.
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Theorem 1.1. (Stolper-Samuelson-Uzawa) For all ω at the optimum and if both goods are pro-
duced, the logarithmic derivative of the relative price of the capital good in terms of the consumption
good is given by:
1
p
dp
dω
=
1
kI(ω) + ω
− 1
kC(ω) + ω
, (24)
which is positive if the consumption sector is relatively more capital-intensive, and negative if
the investment sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
So there is an instantaneous monotonic relation between the wage-rental ratio and the relative
price of output of both industries. In the case the consumption sector is more capital-intensive, a
relative increase of wages leads to an increase in the relative supply cost of the investment good in
terms of the consumption good, so that p(ω) = pI/pC increases. The opposite is true in the case
the investment sector is more capital intensive.
Critical prices and patterns of specialization
Finally, we present the critical input and output relative prices, via which we will define the spe-
cialization frontiers, above and under which occur specialization of production in any of the sectors.
Define, for each k, the two critical wage-rental ratios ωC(k) and ωI(k) by:
ωC(k) =
f
f ′
(k)− k, ωI(k) = g
g′
(k)− k (25)
It is immediate to prove that ωC and ωI are increasing, and that:
lim
k→0
ωC(k) = lim
k→0
ωI(k) = 0 (26)
lim
k→∞
ωC(k) = lim
k→∞
ωI(k) =∞ (27)
and that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1.1. 1. If the consumption sector is relatively capital-intensive, then for all k > 0,
ωC(k) < ωI(k);
2. If the investment sector is relatively capital-intensive, then for all k > 0, ωC(k) > ωI(k).
We now define the minimum and maximum wage-rental ratios by:
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ωmin(k) = min
{
ωC(k), ωI(k)
}
ωmax(k) = max
{
ωC(k), ωI(k)
}
,
(28)
and the critical price ratios by:
pmin(k) = min
{
pC(k), pI(k)
}
pmax(k) = max
{
pC(k), pI(k)
}
,
(29)
where pC(k) = p(ωC(k)) = f
′(kC(ωC(k))
g′(kI(ωC(k)) and p
I(k) = p(ωI(k)) = f
′(kC(ωI(k))
g′(kI(ωI(k)) . Because of theo-
rem 1.1 and proposition 1.1, we have that for each k > 0, pmin(k) = p
C(k) < pmax(k) = p
I(k).
From (25) we see that the functions ωC(k) and ωI(k) are increasing with respect to k. There-
fore, ωmin(k) and ωmax(k) are also increasing. pmin(k) and pmax(k) are both increasing in the case
where the consumption sector is capital-intensive, and both decreasing in the case the investment
sector is capital-intensive.
The critical relative prices pmin and pmax determine the frontiers of specialization in the (k, p)
plan.
When relative price p is less than pmin(k), no investment good is produced as the first unit of
investment good would be too costly to produce in relation to the demand price.
In the hypothetical case where p would be greater than pmax(k), no consumption good would be
produced as consumption would not be valued enough or, equivalently, the last unit of investment
good that is produced when all scarce resources are put in the investment sector brings more
intertemporal utility than the first unit of consumption. This case does not arise at optimum
because the marginal value of consumption goes to infinity when consumption tends to 0.
Finally, both goods are produced if and only if the economy stands somewhere in between
pmin(k) and pmax(k). Patterns of specialization are depicted in figure 2.
2 Preference for the present and the steady-state
Let’s first look at the only possible steady-state. At this stage, no assumption about relative capital
intensities is needed.
A steady-state is a pair (k∗, p∗) such that if (kt, pt) = (k∗, p∗), then (kt+1, pt+1) = (k∗, p∗), with
respect to the dynamical system. Then, ω∗ is uniquely determined by p∗, by theorem 1.1 and so
are lC(k∗, ω∗), kC(ω∗), lI(k∗, ω∗), kI(ω∗), as well as the consumption level c∗, by (18) and (19).
No steady-state exists in the p < pmin region as k cannot remain constant when the economy
is specialized in consumption.
At steady-state, relative price p, wage-rental ratio ω and consumption are all constant. From
(21), q is also constant. From (11) and (16):
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β
(
1− δ + g′ (kI(ω∗))) = 1, (30)
which is independent of the utility function. Capital-labor ratio is obtained by the equation of
zero net investment:
lI(k∗, ω∗)g(kI(ω∗)) =
kC(ω∗)− k∗
kC(ω∗)− kI(ω∗)g(k
I(ω∗)) = δk∗ (31)
Thus, there exists only one unique possible steady-state wage-rental ratio ω∗. If we let θ be the
subjective discount rate, i.e. the positive number such that β = 1/(1 + θ), then ω∗ satisfies the
following fundamental relation:
g′(kI(ω∗)) = δ + θ, (32)
which is reminiscent of the one-sector golden rule “f ′ = g + δ” with no technical change12. At
the quasi-golden rule, capital per worker in the consumption sector is determined by the efficiency
equation (19) while total capital stock is determined by (18) and (30):
g′(kI(ω∗)) = δ + θ (33)
f(kC(ω∗))
f ′(kC(ω∗))
− kC(ω∗) = g(k
I(ω∗))
g′(kI(ω∗))
− kI(ω∗) (34)
k∗ =
g(kI(ω∗))
δ[kC(ω∗)− kI(ω∗)] + g(kI(ω∗))k
C(ω∗) (35)
So the only steady-state wage-rental ratio thus depends solely on the technology of the invest-
ment sector, and not at all on the technology of the consumption sector. To see why this striking
property is true, let’s first look at the limit wage-rental ratio when θ goes to 0, which we dub the
‘pure golden rule’ wage-rental ratio ωGR:
g′(kI(ωGR)) = δ (36)
12See Phelps (1961) and (1965). As said in the introduction of this paper, Cass (1965) presents an optimal one-
sector model with discounting that exhibits the same quasi-golden rule (which he calls “modified”) as we obtain
here. This rule also appears in previous two-sector models including Srinivasan (1964), Uzawa (1965), Shell (1967),
Haque (1970), Galor (1992) and Cremers (2005).
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Clearly ωGR > ω∗.
At (kGR, ωGR) steady-state consumption cannot be increased anymore and a supposedly-free
additional unit of capital would have to be, forever and entirely, installed in the investment sector
to replace its depreciated part over time. From the point of view of the social planner, it is then
more profitable to set this marginal unit of capital it within the consumption sector, and to let it
depreciate gradually over time13. As we see, the argument does not invoke the technology of the
consumption sector: if capital is too costly to preserve, it can only be due to the technology of the
investment sector.
At (k∗, ω∗) steady-state consumption can possibly be increased, but intertemporal benefits are
less than transition costs. At ω∗, one additional unit of capital per head, if forever installed in the
consumption sector, brings an intertemporal benefit of:
∞∑
τ=0
βτ (1− δ)τf ′(kC(ω∗))u′(c∗) = f
′ (kC(ω∗))u′(c∗)
δ + θ
(37)
Another strategy is to first install this unit of capital in the investment sector at τ = 0, letting
it ‘become’ (1− δ+ g′(ω∗)) at τ = 1; and then put this quantity in the consumption sector forever.
Seen from date τ = 0, intertemporal benefits are:
(
1− δ + g′(kI(ω∗))) . ∞∑
τ=1
βτ (1− δ)τf ′ (kC(ω∗))u′(c∗)
=
(
1− δ + g′(kI(ω∗))) [β f ′ (kC(ω∗))u′(c∗)
δ + θ
]
(38)
At optimum, the social planner is indifferent between these two strategies. Equality between
(37) and (38) reduces to the quasi-golden rule (32) and does not itself depend on f ′ nor on u′. The
reason is that whatever the preferences and the production function of the consumption sector, the
marginal increase in utility from installing one more unit of capital per worker in the consumption
sector today f
′(kC(ω∗))u′(c∗)
δ+θ is proportional to the marginal increase in utility from installing one
more unit of capital per worker in the consumption sector in the future β(1−δ+g′) f ′(kC(ω∗))u′(c∗)δ+θ .
At the quasi-golden rule, thus, those costs and benefits balance and only the comparison between
net yield (g′ − δ) and subjective discount rate θ remain relevant.
3 The dynamic system
The hypothesis of no factor-intensity reversal ensures that there is a monotonic relation between p
and ω, so that solving the problem through ω is virtually the same as solving the problem through p.
13At the margin, free capital at optimal steady-state is transitory income which it is optimal to ‘consume’ by
setting it in the consumption sector and not replacing it when it depreciates. This is the opposite conclusion of the
Friedman’s rule, which sees propensity to save out of transitory income as being equal to 1.
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When both goods are produced at t and at t + 1, and in virtue of (2), (6), (11) and (16), the
dynamic system evolves according to:
kt+1 − kt = −δkt + it (39)
ptu
′(ct) = β
(
1− δ + g′ (kI(ωt+1))) pt+1u′(ct+1) (40)
where:
it = l
I(kt, ωt)g(k
I(ωt)) =
kC(ωt)−k
kC(ωt)−kI(ωt)g(k
I(ωt))
ct = l
C(kt, ωt)f(k
C(ωt)) =
kt−kI(ωt)
kC(ωt)−kI(ωt)f(k
C(ωt))
ct+1 = l
C(kt+1, ωt+1)f(k
C(ωt+1)) = l
C⊕(kt, ωt, ωt+1)f(kC(ωt+1))
lC⊕(kt, ωt, ωt+1) =
kt+1(kt,ω
t)−kI(ωt+1)
kC(ωt+1)−kI(ωt+1)
=
(1−δ)kt+ k
C (ωt)−kt
kC (ωt)−kI (ωt)
g(kI(ωt))−kI(ωt+1)
kC(ωt+1)−kI(ωt+1)
(41)
When no investment good is produced at t and when some investment good is produced at
t+ 1, the system is driven by:
kt+1 − kt = −δkt (42)
ptu
′(f(kt)) = β
(
1− δ + g′ (kI(ωt+1))) pt+1u′( (1− δ)kt − kI(ωt+1)
kC(ωt+1)− kI(ωt+1)f(k
C(ωt+1))
)
(43)
When no investment good is produced at t nor at t+ 1, in virtue of (9), the system follows:
kt+1 − kt = −δkt (44)
ptu
′(f(kt)) = β [f ′ ((1− δ)kt) + (1− δ)pt+1]u′ (f((1− δ)kt+1)) (45)
Before turning to the study of the (kt+1 = kt) and (pt+1 = pt) loci and to their stability prop-
erties, a remark is worth making. The system has two differential equations in k and p but only
one initial condition (k0). To close the optimal program, we must also impose the following natural
12
transversality condition:
βtqtkt
t→∞−−−→ 0, (46)
We will see that the phase diagram presents a saddle type. Condition (46) selects the unique
converging path which is the stable arm of the saddle point (k∗, p∗). Remark that this stable arm
is therefore nothing else than the relation between capital relative initial price p∗0 and initial capital
per head k0. Transition takes place along with this curve.
The central result we prove is the following:
Theorem 3.1. When capital level is initially less than its steady-state optimal value, the relative
price of capital in terms of the consumption good increases during transition if the consumption
sector is relatively more capital-intensive, and decreases during transition if the investment sector
is relatively more capital-intensive. The wage-rental ratio always increases.
4 The optimum path: the case of a capital-intensive con-
sumption sector
We now turn to the study of the dynamical system in the case the consumption sector is more
capital-intensive than the investment sector for all wage-rental ratios. In the (k, p) plan, let (KK) =
{(k, p)|(kt, pt) = (k, p) ⇒ kt+1 = k} be the set of pairs (k, p) for which the capital stock remains
constant from period to another, and (PP ) = {(k, p)|(kt, pt) = (k, p) ⇒ pt+1 = p} be the set of
pairs (k, p) for which the relative price of capital remains constant from period to another14.
4.1 The (KK) locus when the consumption sector is capital-intensive
Let’s call k˜ the maximum sustainable capital-labor ratio and let ω˜ denote the corresponding wage-
rental ratio:
g(k˜) = δk˜ (47)
g(kI(ω˜)) = δkI(ω˜) (48)
Capital-labor ratios strictly above k˜ are unsustainable for, then, even if all resources were put
in the investment sector, output would not be sufficient to replace depreciated capital across time.
For k > k˜ therefore, the capital-labor ratio cannot remain constant. k˜ is exactly sustained if the
economy specializes in the production of the investment good, i.e. if p > pmax.
14These notations are borrowed from Galor (1992).
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Define the ratio of the derivatives of technical marginal rates of substitution between the two
sectors:
1 + λ(ω) =
−gg′′
g′2 (k
I(ω))
−ff ′′
f ′2 (k
C(ω))
> 0 (49)
From (20), we have that:
∂kC
∂ω
= (1 + λ(ω))
∂kI
∂ω
(50)
We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. When the consumption sector is relatively more capital-intensive, it holds that:
∂lI(k, ω)g(kI(ω))
∂ω
> 0 (51)
∂lI(k, ω)g(kI(ω))
∂k
< 0 (52)
Proof. Dropping the subscript ω:
∂lI
∂ω
=
∂ k
C−k
kC−kI
∂ω
=
∂kI
∂ω
1 + λlC
kC − kI .
As λ > −1, we have that 1 + λlC > 1− lC = lI ≥ 0. And so:
∂lIg(kI)
∂ω
=
∂kI
∂ω
 1 + λlCkC − kI g(kI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ lIg′(kI)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 > 0.
On the other hand,
∂lIg(kI)
∂k
= − g(k
I)
kC − kI < 0,
which completes the proof.
Inequality (52) reflects the validity of Rybczynski’s (1955) theorem: if k increase, the output of
the capital-intensive industry increases while the output of the labor-intensive industry decreases.
Inequality (51) is surprising at first sight, as one would expect an increase in the wage-rental
ratio to relatively disadvantage the industry that is more labor-intensive (i.e. the investment good
industry). But an increase in ω yields an increase in the relative price of the investment good p
and, all things being equal, an increase in the relative profit of the investment sector that leads
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to an expansion in production of the investment good. The capital-labor ratio increases in both
sectors as the result of substitution between inputs, but lI increases while lC decreases. We also
show below (lemma 4.2) that and lCf(kC) is decreasing with respect to the wage-rental ratio,
reflecting a net shift of capital and labor resources from the consumption sector to the investment
sector when the wage-rental ratio goes up.
For each ω ∈ (0, ω˜), there exists one and only one value of k that induces zero net investment.
In view of the results of lemma 4.1, the capital-labor ratio is determined like in figure 3. When ω
increases, the lIg(kI) curve shifts up, and the δk curve does not change. Because the former is a
decreasing function of k, this shift induces an increase in the corresponding capital-labor ratio.
Consequently, the (KK) curve is as represented in figure 4.
The (KK) locus is stable: if we move north from a point that is on (KK) by increasing p –
and so ω – while keeping k constant, real investment will tend to increase because of (51), thus
driving the system toward the right, i.e. towards (KK).
4.2 The (PP) locus when the consumption sector is capital-intensive
The analysis of the (PP ) curve is more delicate. We know from section 2 that (PP ) and (KK)
only cross at (k∗, p∗, ω∗).
Define, for each (k, ω):
k⊕ = (1− δ)k + lI(k, ω)g(kI(ω)) = (1− δ)k + k
C(ω)− k
kC(ω)− kI(ω)g(k
I(ω)) (53)
In the non-specialization region between the pmin and pmax curves, from (40), the relative
price p remains constant from one period to the next15 if and only if the wage-rental ratio and the
capital-labor ratio verify the following equality:
u′(c(k, ω)) = β
(
1− δ + g′(kI(ω)))u′(c⊕(k, ω)) (54)
where:
c =
k − kI(ω)
kC(ω)− kI(ω)f(k
C(ω)) (55)
c⊕ =
k⊕ − kI(ω)
kC(ω)− kI(ω)f(k
C(ω)) (56)
15Once again, recall that p remains constant if and only if ω remains constant.
15
When the capital-labor ratio stands initially at k and that the wage-rental ratio stays at ω at
current and next period, c and c⊕ therefore respectively denote current and next period’s con-
sumption.
In the non-specialization region, (54) determines a unique wage-rental ratio ωPP (k) that is
consistent with stability of relative prices from one period to the next.
Next step is to show that (PP ) is increasing in the (k, p) plan. The local result always holds
with no further assumption. The semi-global conclusion will necessitate two other assumptions.
We therefore separate the two.
Let’s first enunciate a lemma that always holds:
Lemma 4.2. For all ω > 0,
∂lC
∂ω
< 0 (57)
∂c
∂ω
< 0 (58)
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 4.1. When the consumption sector is relatively capital-intensive, function is ωPP (k)
locally strictly increasing around quasi-golden rule capital-labor ratio k∗.
Proof.
Lemma 4.3. (
∂lC⊕
∂ω
− ∂l
C
∂ω
)∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
> 0 (59)
∂
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
> 0 (60)
∂
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
< 0 (61)
Proof. See appendix for the proof of the lemma.
From (60) and (61), around balanced capital-labor ratio k∗, the ωPP wage-rental ratio is de-
termined like in figure 5 which proves graphically – but the algebra is straightforward – that (PP )
is locally strictly increasing at quasi-golden rule steady-state16.
16Remark that, for the conclusion to hold, it is sufficient that
∂
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
> βg′′(kI) ∂k
I
∂ω
.
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We now show that (PP ) crosses (KK) from above:
Proposition 4.2. Around steady-state capital-labor ratio k∗, ωPP (k) > ωKK(k) for k < k∗ and
ωPP (k) < ωKK(k) for k > k∗.
Proof. Because (PP ) is locally strictly upward-sloping, then ωPP (k) < ω∗ for k < k∗. Conse-
quently, for k < k∗ we have that β
(
1− δ + g′(kI(ωPP ))) > 1 which, in virtue of (54), implies that
c < c⊕ on the (PP ) locus. From (53), (55) and (56), this implies that the (PP ) locus lies in the
region where lIg(kI) > δk when k < k∗. Because the (KK) branch is stable, this region is located
above (KK).
We now show that the result that (PP ) is locally upward-sloping can be generalized to the
(0, k∗) interval – which is the one of interest if one focuses on the case of an initially under-
capitalized economy – at the cost of two additional assumptions:
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that absolute risk-aversion coefficient
(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
is decreasing and that
∀ω ∈ (0, ω∗), λ(ω) ∈ (−1, 1). Then function ωPP (k) is strictly increasing for k < k∗, and so the
(PP ) curve is increasing in the (k, p) plan for k < k∗.
Proof. These two additional assumptionFFirst, remark that from proposition (4.2), we know that
for k < k∗, (PP ) lies above (KK). Au s (KK) is stable, when (k, p) ∈ (PP ), k and p necessarily
verify that lI(k, ω)g(kI(ω)) > δk where ω = ω(p) like implicitly defined by theorem 1.1. And so,
from (53) and (56), we have that lC⊕ > lC and c⊕ > c on the (PP ) curve for k < k∗.
Lemma 4.4. When absolute risk-aversion −u′′(c)u′(c) is decreasing and that ∀ω ∈ (0, ω∗), λ(ω) ∈
(−1, 1):
∂(lC⊕ − lC)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
ω≤ω∗
> 0 (62)
∂ u
′(c)
u′(c⊕)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω≤ω∗
> 0 (63)
∂ u
′(c)
u′(c⊕)
∂k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω≤ω∗
< 0 (64)
Proof. See appendix for the proof of the lemma.
Thereby, when ω ≤ ω∗, the situation is still like depicted in figure 5 and the (PP ) curve is
increasing at the left of steady-state.
Final step to prove the saddle property of the (k, p) system is to show that the (PP ) locus is
unstable:
Proposition 4.4. When the consumption sector is relatively capital-intensive, the (PP ) locus is
unstable.
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Proof. In the (pmin, pmax) region, and from equation (40), p changes through time according to:
pt+1
pt
=
u′(ct)
β (1− δ + g′(kI(ωt+1)))u′(ct+1) , (65)
Suppose, for example, that the system initially stands at steady-state and suddenly moves right
at t, so that k increases while ω stays at ω∗. From (61), we conclude that u
′(ct)
β(1−δ+g′(kI(ω∗)))u′(ct+1)
shall tend to decrease. From (65), pt+1pt will also tend to decrease from a value of 1, and so pt+1
will become less than pt. As (PP ) is upward-sloping, this proves that the (PP ) locus is locally
unstable around p∗.
4.3 The local saddle
In view of the results above, we are now able to represent the local phase diagram in figure 6.
(PP ) crosses (KK) from above at the quasi-golden rule steady-state and both curves are locally
increasing. (KK) is stable and (PP ) is unstable, so that the steady-state is a saddle point. The
stable arm is represented by the arrowed curve. Any path reaching the north-east or the south-west
quadrants diverges. We see graphically that k and p must necessarily move in same direction along
the only stable path.
So locally, the relative price of the investment good and the wage-rental ratio increase during
transition if initial capital-labor ratio is less than k∗. The opposite happens in the case the economy
starts with ‘too-much’ capital. Notice that this result does not necessitate any assumption about
risk-aversion nor about the coefficient λ.
4.4 The optimal transition path
If we take the two additional assumptions that absolute risk aversion −u′′(c)u′(c) is decreasing with
respect to c and that λ(ω) always stands at less than 1 for ω ≤ ω∗, then the (PP ) curve is upward-
sloping in the (0, k∗) interval. Consequently, the stable arm of the saddle is globally increasing
for k ≤ k∗. This is summarized by figure 7. An economy starting from an initial capital-labor of
k0 < k
∗ sees relative price of investment initially set at p017 gradually increase during transition
towards p∗ > p0.
5 The optimum path: the case of a capital-intensive invest-
ment sector
The formal identities we have put for the case where the consumption sector is relatively more
capital-intensive are still valid, but often conclusions will be opposite. Still, it is straightforward
to adapt the results of the previous section to the case where kI(ω) > kC(ω) for all ω > 0.
17Recall that determinacy of the initial relative price p0 and of initial wage-rental ratio ω0 is a consequence of the
transversality condition (46) imposed to the dynamical system.
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From theorem 1.1, there exists now a negative correspondence between p and ω: an increase in
ω increases the relative costs of the consumption industry (which is now labor-intensive) which in
turn make consumption goods relatively more expensive.
5.1 The (KK) locus when the investment sector is capital-intensive
Equation of the (KK) locus in the non-specialization region of the (k, p) plan between pmin and
pmax is now:
k − kC(ω)
kI(ω)− kC(ω)g(k
I(ω)) = δk, (66)
which determines, for all k < k˜ one unique wage-rental ratio ωKK(k) consistent with zero net
investment, where k˜ is the maximum sustainable capital-labor ratio defined in (47).
Let’s first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5.1. When the investment sector is relatively more capital-intensive:
∂lI(k, ω)
∂ω
< 0 (67)
∂lI(k, ω)g(kI(ω))
∂ω
< 0 (68)
And on the (KK) curve, it holds that:
∂lI(k, ω)g(kI(ω))
∂k
∣∣∣∣
lIg(kI)=δk
> δ(> 0) (69)
Proof. • ∂lI∂ω = −∂k
I
∂ω
1+λlC
kI−kC < 0.
• ∂lIg(kI)∂ω = ∂k
I
∂ω
(
−(1 + λlC) g(kI)
kI−kC + l
Ig′(kI)
)
But λ > −1 ⇒ −(1 + λlC) < −lI and g(kI)
kI−kC >
g(kI)
kI
> g′(kI), which permits to conclude
that ∂l
Ig(kI)
∂ω < 0.
• ∂lIg(kI)∂k = g(k
I)
kI−kC =
lIg(kI)
k−kC and so:
∂lI(k, ω)g(kI(ω))
∂k
∣∣∣∣
lIg(kI)=δk
=
δk
k − kC =
δ
1− kCk
which is strictly greater than δ because k > kC when the investment sector is relatively more
capital-intensive18.
18Remark this is a strong version of the Rybczynski (1955) theorem.
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Therefore, for each k < k˜, ωKK(k) is determined like in figure 8, which demonstrates graphi-
cally that ωKK is increasing with respect to k, meaning that the (KK) locus is decreasing in the
(k, p) plan (because of theorem 1.1) for k ∈ (0, k˜). Figure 9 represents the (KK) locus when the
investment sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
The (KK) locus is now unstable: from (69) we know that ∂(l
Ig(kI)−δk)
∂k > 0 on the portion of
(KK) that lies in the non-specialization region. Therefore, if we move right from a point on the
decreasing part of (KK), this increase in k will induce an increase in net investment, making the
capital stock increase and the economy shift further to the right.
5.2 The (PP) locus when the investment sector is capital-intensive
The general shape of the (PP ) locus is undefined, even for k < k∗ and with the assumptions
made in section 4 when consumption was supposed to be relatively capital-intensive. But we show
that (PP ) is locally downward-sloping and it crosses (KK) from below. In the case of an initially
under-capitalized economy, we show graphically that the optimum path goes along the (KK) curve
from above, and, consequently, we suggest that the form of (PP ) shape is of secondary importance.
As the construct of the (global) (KK) locus did not require any assumption, so will the shape of
the optimal path for an economy starting from arbitrarily low.
The equation of the (PP ) curve is still the same:
u′(c(k, ω)) = β
(
1− δ + g′(kI(ω)))u′(c⊕(k, ω)), (70)
where, for each (k, ω):
k⊕ = (1− δ)k + lI(k, ω)g(kI(ω)) = (1− δ)k + k − k
C(ω)
kI(ω)− kC(ω)g(k
I(ω)) (71)
c =
kI(ω)− k
kI(ω)− kC(ω)f(k
C(ω)) (72)
c⊕ =
kI(ω)− k⊕
kI(ω)− kC(ω)f(k
C(ω)) (73)
Those expressions are the same as in the preceding section and are simply rewritten so that all
numerators and denominators are positive.
The whole implicitly defines, in the neighborhood of k∗ and in the (0, k∗) a unique ωPP (k) > 0
that satisfies (70).
Consumption is now always increasing in the wage-rental ratio, as:
20
∂lC
∂ω
=
∂kI
∂ω
1 + λlC
kI − kC > 0 (74)
∂lCf(kC)
∂ω
=
∂lC
∂ω
f(kC) + lC
∂kC
∂ω
f ′(kC) > 0 (75)
By the following proposition, we conclude that the (PP ) curve is now downward-sloping in the
(k, p) plan:
Proposition 5.1. When the investment sector is relatively capital-intensive, function is ωPP (k)
locally strictly increasing around quasi-golden rule capital-labor ratio k∗.
Proof. Inequalities of lemma 4.3 are not modified when the investment sector is supposed to be
the capital-intensive sector:
Lemma 5.2. (
∂lC⊕
∂ω
− ∂l
C
∂ω
)∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
> 0 (76)
∂
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
> 0 (77)
∂
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
< 0 (78)
Proof. See appendix for the proof of the lemma.
Hence, in the neighborhood of k∗, ωPP (k) is – as in section 4 – determined like in figure 5 when
the investment sector is capital-intensive, and ωPP (k) is locally increasing around k∗.
As p and ω follow a negative relationship by theorem 1.1, the (PP ) curve is locally downward-
sloping around steady-state in the (k, p) space when the investment sector is capital-intensive.
(PP ) crosses (KK) from below in the (k, p) plan when the investment sector is capital-intensive:
Proposition 5.2. Around steady-state capital-labor ratio k∗, ωPP (k) > ωKK(k) for k < k∗ and
ωPP (k) < ωKK(k) for k > k∗.
Proof. Because ωPP (k) is locally increasing around k∗, ωPP (k) < ω∗ for k < k∗. Consequently,
for k < k∗ we have that β
(
1− δ + g′(kI(ωPP ))) > 1 which, in virtue of (70), implies that c < c⊕
on the (PP ) locus. From (71), (72) and (73), this implies that the (PP ) locus lies in the region
where lIg(kI) < δk when k < k∗. Because the (KK) locus is unstable, this region is located below
(KK).
The (PP ) branch is now stable. p changes through time according to:
pt+1
pt
=
u′(ct)
β (1− δ + g′(kI(ωt+1)))u′(ct+1) (79)
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Suppose that the economy initially stands at the quasi-golden rule steady-state, and suddenly
experiences a shift to the right at t, so that k increases while ω stays at ω∗. Then, from equation
(78), u
′(ct)
β(1−δ+g′(kI(ω∗)))u′(ct+1) will tend to decrease. From (79),
pt+1
pt
will be less than one which
proves that p will tend to decrease. As (PP ) is downward-sloping, this proves that the (PP ) locus
is locally unstable around p∗.
5.3 The local saddle
The local phase diagram is represented in figure 10. (KK) and (PP ) are both decreasing in the
around (k∗, p∗) and (KK) is initially above (PP ). As (KK) and (PP ) are respectively stable and
unstable, the system displays a local saddle which stable arm is sketched with arrows. Locally,
along the optimal path, p (resp. ω) and k move in opposite (resp. same) direction.
5.4 The optimal transition path
As figure 10, the optimal path tends to follow the (KK) curve, while it tended to follow the (PP )
locus when the consumption sector was supposed to be relatively capital-intensive. Here, (PP )
lies below (KK) for k < k∗, while the optimal path is above (KK). Hence, the exact shape of
the (PP ) curve when k < k∗ is of secondary interest. As it does not require further assumptions
to prove that the (KK) locus is downward-sloping in the (k, p) plan when k < k∗, we conclude
that the optimal path of accumulation for an economy starting at k0 < k
∗ is also monotonically
downward-sloping and lies above (KK). This path is represented in figure 11.
6 Some comparative dynamics: the effect of a negative shock
on the discount rate
An interesting exercise is to analyze the dynamic effect of a decrease of the rate of preference for
the present θ. When the agents are more patient, the new steady-state is characterized by a higher
wage-rental ratio ω∗ (equation (32)), higher capital intensities in both sectors (equations (19) and
(20)) and a higher aggregate capital-labor ratio (equation (35)).
Suppose that the economy initially stands at the (k∗, p∗) steady-state consistent with a rate
of preference for the present θ > 0, and suppose that this parameter θ unexpectedly falls to zero
at date t and forever. The economy’s new steady-state corresponds to the two-sector version of
the pure Phelpsian golden rule g′ = δ where steady-state consumption is maximized (see equation
(36)).
Equation of (KK) is independent of θ and so the (KK) locus remains unchanged. We discussed
above that the (PP ) locus is determined by a graph like that of figure 5. When β increases, u
′(c)
u′(c⊕)
remains unchanged and β(1− δ+ g′) = 11+θ (1− δ+ g′) goes up. As the situation depicted in figure
5 holds regardless of the capital-intensive sector, ωPP (k) increases for all k in both cases. In virtue
of theorem 1.1, (PP ) shifts up in the case the consumption sector is relatively capital-intensive
and it shifts down if the investment sector is relatively capital-intensive. We see in figure 12 that
the optimal path shifts up in both cases.
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What happens after this unexpected shock? At t, the capital stock is fixed at k∗ corresponding
to pre-shock steady-state. When the shock hits, the relative price of capital adjusts so as to put the
economy immediately on its (new) optimal path to golden rule steady-state. Because the optimal
path shifts up regardless of the capital-intensity assumption, we can conclude that p jumps up
in any case: the fall of the rate of impatience to zero induces an immediate positive jump in the
relative price of capital in terms of consumption good. As the discount rate decreases, the price of
capital is instantly positively revalued.
In a second phase, the economy gradually converges to golden rule steady-state. As capital
accumulates, labor becomes relatively-scarce in relation to capital, and so the wage-rental ratio
increases during transition. In the case the consumption sector is more capital-intensive, relative
price of capital thus tends to increase during this phase. In the case the investment sector is
relatively capital-intensive, it gradually decreases toward a value that stands at less than its pre-
shock steady-state level.
7 Concluding remarks
In the two-sector Ramsey framework presented, any economy that starts from a capital-ratio k0
that is less than the balanced ratio k∗ monotonically converges to steady-state (k∗, p∗).
Optimal transition always takes place with increases in relative wages, independently of any
capital-intensity assumption. Because supply of one factor of production (labor) remains constant
while supply of the other one (capital) increases, relative remuneration must must follow the
opposite pattern. The flow’s approach conclusion is that relative rental decreases as capital is
accumulated. Figure 13 represents the local phase diagrams in the (k, ω) space which highlights
the fact that, while the dynamic system is qualitatively different in the two cases, the optimal path
of accumulation always goes with an increase in relative wages.
We would tend to think that, from a stock perspective, capital would become cheaper as it
becomes more abundant along with the transition. Perhaps surprisingly, it happens that this con-
clusion necessarily rests on a capital-intensity assumption. If the consumption sector is relatively
capital-intensive, then capital gains are natural during transition; but if it is the investment sector
that is relatively capital-intensive, transition takes place with a smooth decrease in relative capital
price. This is because of the Stolper-Samuelson-Uzawa effect: as capital become more abundant,
its (macroeconomic) reward must necessarily goes down, which relatively favors the costs of the
capital-intensive sector.
The model presented is not, in absence of technical progress, able to give any insight in the
growth phenomenon. But the centrality of the capital sector in the expression of the (quasi-)golden
rule signals that technical progress will likely induce different effects on consumption and GDP,
but also on wages, relative prices, asset prices, etc. according to the sector which sees its efficiency
increase. Gort, Greenwood and Rupert (1999) and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) show
that post-war US data seems to show that investment-specific technical change is responsible for
an overwhelming share of growth. This is scope for future theoretical research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 The critical relative price ratio and the production frontier
Figure 14 represents, for a certain capital endowment per unit of labor, the production possibility
frontier. The hypothesis of diminishing marginal returns implies that this curve has the represented
concave form. −pmin(k) is the slope of this curve at the point (c = 0, i = g(k)) while −pmax(k) is
the slope of the same curve at the point where (c = f(k), i = 0). When k increases, the frontier
moves northeast. In the case where the consumption sector is more capital-intensive, pmin and
pmax tend to increase too, while the contrary happens when the investment sector is more capital
intensive. These two cases are depicted in figure 15.
8.2 Proof of lemma (4.2)
• ∂lC∂ω =
∂ k−k
I
kC−kI
∂ω =
− ∂kI∂ω (kC−kI)−(k−kI)(∂kC/∂ω−∂kI/∂ω)
(kC−kI)2 . Consequently, from (50):
∂lC
∂ω
= −∂k
I
∂ω
1 + λlC
kC − kI , (80)
which is negative because λ > −1⇒ 1 + λlC > 1− lC = lI ≥ 0 and kC − kI > 0.
• ∂c∂ω = ∂l
Cf(kC)
∂ω =
∂kI
∂ω
(
(1 + λ)lCf ′(kC)− (1 + λlC) f(kC)
kC−kI
)
. Because (1 +λ)lC ≤ 1 +λlC , we
have that:
∂c
∂ω
≤ ∂k
I
∂ω
(1 + λ)lC
f ′(kC)− f(kC)kC − kI︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 < 0.
8.3 Proof of lemma (4.3)
• ∂(lC⊕−lC)∂ω = ∂∂ω l
Ig(kI)−δk
kC−kI . And so, for all ω > 0,
∂(lC⊕ − lC)
∂ω
=
∂kI
∂ω
1
kC − kI
(
1 + λlC
kC − kI g(k
I) + lIg′(kI)− λl
Ig(kI)− δk
kC − kI
)
(81)
At ω = ω∗, the last term is zero. More over, λ > −1⇒ 1 + λlC > 1− lC = lI ≥ 0 and so:
∂(lC⊕ − lC)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
=
∂kI
∂ω
1
kC − kI
(
1 + λlC
kC − kI g(k
I) + lIg′(kI)
)
> 0.
•
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω =
∂c⊕
∂ω
(
−u′′(c⊕)u′(c⊕)
)
− ∂c∂ω
(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
. But at ω = ω∗, lC⊕ = lC , c⊕ = c, and:
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∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
=
(
∂c⊕
∂ω − ∂c∂ω
)(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
=
(
∂(lC⊕−lC)f(kC)
∂ω
)(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
=

∂lC⊕∂ω − ∂lC∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 f(kC) + (lC⊕ − lC︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
)∂k
C
∂ω f
′(kC)
(−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
> 0.
•
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂k =
∂c⊕
∂k
(
−u′′(c⊕)u′(c⊕)
)
− ∂c∂k
(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
. But ∂c∂k =
1
kC−kI f
′(kC) > 0 and ∂c⊕∂k =
1−δ− g(kI )
kC−kI
kC−kI f
′(kC) < ∂c∂k . But at ω = ω
∗, c⊕ = c and so:
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
=
∂c⊕∂k − ∂c∂k︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0

−u′′(c)u′(c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 < 0.
8.4 Proof of lemma (4.4)
• (81) holds for all ω > 0, and so it holds for ω ≤ ω∗. When ω ≤ ω∗, lIg(kI) − δk > 0. And
so, if λ ∈ (−1, 0), then −λ lIg(kI)−δk
kC−kI > 0. and so
∂(lC⊕−lC)
∂ω > 0. If λ ∈ (0, 1), then (and also
because 1 + λlC > lI):
∂(lC⊕−lC)
∂ω >
∂kI
∂ω
1
kC−kI
(
lI
kC−kI g(k
I) + lIg′(kI)− λ lIg(kI)−δk
kC−kI
)
= ∂k
I
∂ω
1
kC−kI
(
(1− λ) lIg(kI)−δk
kC−kI + l
Ig′(kI) + λ δk
kC−kI
)
> 0.
• ∂(lC⊕−lC)∂ω > 0 implies that
∂(c⊕ − c)
∂ω
=
∂kI
∂ω
(
∂(lC⊕ − lC)
∂ω
f(kC) + (1 + λ)f ′(kC)
)
> 0 (82)
When ω < ω∗, c⊕ > c along (PP ) and, by the assumption made, we have that −u
′′(c⊕)
u′(c⊕)
<
−u′′(c)u′(c) . If ∂c⊕∂ω > 0, then we immediately have that19:
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω
=
∂c⊕
∂ω︸︷︷︸
>0
(
−u
′′(c⊕)
u′(c⊕)
)
− ∂c
∂ω︸︷︷︸
<0
(
−u
′′(c)
u′(c)
)
> 0.
19Remark that, if
∂c⊕
∂ω
> 0, the proof does not require the assumption that absolute risk-aversion is decreasing. In
this case, an increase in the wage-rental ratio today leads to a decrease in consumption and an increase in investment
today. But this increase in investment increases tomorrow’s capital stock. And as ∂c
∂k
> 0, c⊕ tends to decrease
less consecutively to an increase in ω than c. If
∂c⊕
∂ω
> 0, it means that this intertemporal effect is strong enough
to make c⊕ increase consecutively to an increase of the wage-rental ratio. A sufficient condition for that is that
∂lC⊕
∂ω
> 0.
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If 0 > ∂c⊕∂ω >
∂c
∂ω , then:
(
0 < −∂c⊕∂ω < − ∂c∂ω and 0 < −u
′′(c⊕)
u′(c⊕)
< −u′′(c)u′(c)
)
⇒ −∂c⊕∂ω
(
−u′′(c⊕)u′(c⊕)
)
< − ∂c∂ω
(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
⇒
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω > 0.
• Similarly, when c⊕ ≥ c – and consequently −u
′′(c⊕)
u′(c⊕)
< −u′′(c)u′(c) – we have that:
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂k =
∂c⊕
∂k
(
−u′′(c⊕)u′(c⊕)
)
− ∂c∂k
(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
≤
∂c⊕∂k − ∂c∂k︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(−u′′(c)u′(c) )
< 0.
8.5 Proof of lemma (5.2)
• Equation (81) still formally holds. Let’s rewrite it as:
∂(lC⊕ − lC)
∂ω
=
∂kI
∂ω
1
kI − kC
(
1 + λlC
kI − kC g(k
I)− lIg′(kI)− λl
Ig(kI)− δk
kI − kC
)
(83)
At ω = ω∗, we have that:
∂(lC⊕ − lC)
∂ω
=
∂kI
∂ω
1
kI − kC
(
1 + λlC
kI − kC g(k
I)− lIg′(kI)
)
>
∂kI
∂ω
1
kI − kC
(
lI
kI − kC g(k
I)− lIg′(kI)
)
,
which is positive since g(k
I)
kI−kC >
g(kI)
kI
> g′(kI).
• On the (PP ) curve at ω = ω∗, c = c⊕ and:
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
=
(
∂c⊕
∂ω − ∂c∂ω
)(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
=

∂lC⊕∂ω − ∂lC∂ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 f(kC) + (lC⊕ − lC︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
)∂k
C
∂ω f
′(kC)
(−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂ω
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
> 0.
• In the case the investment sector is relatively capital-intensive, we have that:
∂c
∂k
=
−1
kI − kC f(k
C) < 0
∂c⊕
∂k
=
−1− δ − g(kI)
kI−kC
kI − kC f(k
C) <
∂c
∂k
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Consequently:
∂ ln
(
u′(c)
u′(c⊕)
)
∂k
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ω=ω∗
= ∂c⊕∂k
(
−u′′(c⊕)u′(c⊕)
)
− ∂c∂k
(
−u′′(c)u′(c)
)
=
∂c⊕∂k − ∂c∂k︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(−u′′(c)u′(c) )
< 0.
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Figures
Figure 1: Price deflators for GDP, private consumption and private fixed investment, USA, 1982–
2010. Quarterly, seasonally-adjusted data (source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA database
(www.bea.gov). 1982-I = 100).
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Figure 2: Patterns of specialization in the (k, p) plan when (left) the consumption sector is relatively
more capital-intensive and when (right) the investment sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
Figure 3: The determination for each ω ∈ (0, ω˜) of the capital-labor ratio k inducing zero net
investment for the case the consumption sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
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Figure 4: The {kt+1 = kt} locus when the consumption sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
Figure 5: Determination of the ωPP (k) wage-rental ratio.
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Figure 6: The local phase diagram around quasi-golden rule steady-state when the consumption
sector is relatively more capital- intensive.
Figure 7: The optimal path for an initially underdeveloped economy (k0 < k
∗) when the consump-
tion sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
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Figure 8: The determination for each ω ∈ (0, ω˜) of the capital-labor ratio k inducing zero net
investment for the case the investment sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
Figure 9: The {kt+1 = kt} locus when the investment sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
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Figure 10: The local phase diagram around quasi-golden rule steady-state when the investment
sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
Figure 11: The optimal path for an initially underdeveloped economy (k0 < k
∗) when the invest-
ment sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
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Figure 12: The dynamic effect of a ‘θ → 0’ shock when (left) the consumption sector is relatively
more capital-intensive and when (right) the investment sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
Figure 13: The optimal paths in the (k, ω) plan when (left) the consumption sector is relatively
more capital-intensive and when (right) the investment sector is relatively more capital-intensive.
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Figure 14: The production possibility frontier for some k > 0.
Figure 15: Shifts of the production possibility frontier when k increases. At the left for the
case where the consumption sector is more capital-intensive, at the right for the case where the
investment sector is more capital-intensive. In the former case, limit prices tend to increase while
in the latter case, they tend to decrease.
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